Sherman, Texas Criminal Trial Attorney: The Right to A Speedy Trial in Texas (Part 2)

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals analyzes both speedy trial and speedy revocation motion matters under the factors set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). These factors include: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reasons for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right (to a speedy trial), and (4) the possible prejudice to the Defendant as a result of the delay. As applied to this case, the State cannot overcome the presumptive prejudice associated with a thirty eight month delay in executing the capias, a similar delay in hearing from the time of issuance, and at least three of four Barker factors weigh in favor of dismissal.

In Barker, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the “length of delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.  The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has found a two year and ten month delay between arrest and hearing on a speedy trial motion to be “presumptively prejudicial” in a “plain vanilla DWI case.” Zamorano v. State, 84 S.W. 3d 643, 649, 654 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). In addition, the Zamorano Court found that the factor of delay, in and of itself, weighed “heavily against the State,” after considering the almost four-year delay between arrest and ultimate resolution of the case. Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 649.