Articles Posted in Texas Criminal Law

InmateJudging delay is one area where analysis under the due diligence doctrine remains relevant. Under the due diligence doctrine, the court looks to whether “reasonable investigative efforts [were] made to apprehend the person sought.” Peacock, 77 S.W.3d at 288. Per Peacock, such a requirement “helps a court determine whether the probationer cannot be found because he is trying to elude capture or because no one is looking for him,” and in the case of the latter “the State should not benefit by doing nothing meaningful to execute a capias.” The Court of Criminal Appeals has made clear that merely sending a letter to the Defendant’s home and uploading a warrant into the TCIC database does not constitute diligence on the part of the State. Peacock, 77 S.W.3d at 288-89.  A probation who stays in state at a known address and known phone number, without probation coming to look for him and arrest him, has a great due diligence claim.  A Texas resident who stays in the State at a known address and phone number also can show unreasonable delay if a warrant is issued at large for their arrest for a new crime and no effort is made to apprehend them.  Leaving the state or country, however, can cause the speedy trial right to be tolled, and doing so is a factor that will hurt the defendant in a speedy trial analysis.

hourglassBut, despite the elimination of the common law due diligence “scheme,” the Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized in both pre-Garcia case law and post-Garcia case law that there exists a Constitutional speedy revocation hearing right even where claims of common law due diligence do not lie. The Court of Criminal Appeals specifically held this to be the case in Ballard v. State, stating “[a]lthough such a defendant cannot advance a due diligence defense, he has the statutory twenty-day remedy, and in appropriate circumstances, may have a Constitutional speedy hearing claim under Barker v. Wingo.” 126 S.W.3d 919, 921 n.8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)(citations omitted).  The 20-day remedy is found in Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 42A.751(d) (If the defendant has not been released on bail as permitted under Subsection (c), on motion by the defendant, the judge who ordered the arrest for the alleged violation of a condition of community supervision shall cause the defendant to be brought before the judge for a hearing on the alleged violation within 20 days of the date the motion is filed.)

Speedy hearing is a right whose recognition dates back at least as far as 1972 as illustrated by the Court of Criminal Appeals in Carney v. State, 573 S.W.2d 24, 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (“The right to a speedy trial guaranteed by the Constitutions of the United States and Texas is applicable to probation revocation hearings.”) (citations which include cases dating back to 1972 omitted). Per Carney, a denial of speedy revocation rights should be analyzed in the same manner as a denial of speedy trial under the Barker v. Wingo four prong balancing test. Carney, 573 S.W.2d at 27. The Dallas Court of Appeals has recognized this proposition of law as recently as 2015 in the unpublished case of Reed v. State, 2015 WL 4485550 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015).

TrialA Defendant formally accused of violating probation also has the right to a speedy revocation hearing. In addition to statutory provisions addressing timeliness in motions to revoke, the Court of Criminal Appeals has historically recognized two sources of law which provide for the right to a speedy revocation hearing: (1) the statutory and former common law doctrine of due diligence, and (2) Constitutional speedy hearing rights under Barker v. Wingo. 407 U.S. 514 (1971).  of due diligence has been superseded by statute in Article 42A.751(d).

In 2015, the Texas Legislature added the statutory due diligence defense to the Code of Criminal Procedure, which overrode the common law defense.  It states:  For the purposes of a hearing under Article 42A.751(d), it is an affirmative defense to revocation for an alleged violation based on a failure to report to a supervision officer as directed or to remain within a specified place that no supervision officer, peace officer, or other officer with the power of arrest under a warrant issued by a judge for that alleged violation contacted or attempted to contact the defendant in person at the defendant’s last known residence address or last known employment address, as reflected in the files of the department serving the county in which the order of community supervision was entered.

When a motion to revoke is filed, the judge normally issues a warrant for the probationer’s arrest, though they may issue a summons.  After fifty years of recognition by the Court of Criminal Appeals, the common law doctrine of due diligence in executing a warrant in motions to revoke has been eliminated. Compare Peacock v. State, 77 S.W.3d 285, 288-89 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (finding it imprudent to overturn 40 years of precedent requiring due diligence by State in executing motion to revoke capias) with Garcia v. State, 387 S.W.3d 20, 22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (“we conclude that the 2003 statutory amendments to the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 42.12 replaced the common-law due-diligence scheme).

TrialBlocksThe reasons for the delay of a trial are important under the second prong, and the State will be required to put forward their reasons at a dismissal hearing.  Right now, blood and drug results from the State laboratory are taking six months or so to process.   A person sitting in jail on a misdemeanor is heavily prejudiced by waiting that long on a chemical result.   A person awaiting felony trial is not as prejudiced per the caselaw, but after nine months or so prejudice can sometimes be shown.   A lawyer should consider filing a speedy trial motion in any trial that will be lengthily delayed by chemical testing, DNA testing or other factors under the State’s control.

Timely assertion of the right is important as the third factor of the Barker analysis. The Court of Criminal Appeals recognized this in Zamorano when the Court categorized the Defendant’s request for speedy trial as “tardy” but found that the “defendant’s assertion of the right” prong should not weigh against the defendant because it was not a case where the Defendant never asked for a hearing and noted “nothing indicated an affirmative desire for delay” on the part of the defendant. Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 652.   There are often reasons that a defendant would want a delay in trial proceedings, especially in the case of a potentially large sentence.   An attorney filing continuances or a defendant continually signing pass slips can be something the Court will look at.  The Dallas Court in Reed stated that a motion to dismiss gets lesser weight than an assertion of the right/motion for speedy hearing in a probation revocation case.

Zamorano also illustrates that very little prejudice need be shown by the Defendant in cases involving considerable delay under the fourth prong of the Barker analysis. In fact, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that missing 11 days of work and having to regularly check in with a bail bond company was sufficient prejudice in light of the delay. Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 654.

SpeedyTrial-300x149The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals analyzes both speedy trial and speedy revocation motion matters under the factors set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). These factors include: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reasons for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right (to a speedy trial), and (4) the possible prejudice to the Defendant as a result of the delay. As applied to this case, the State cannot overcome the presumptive prejudice associated with a thirty eight month delay in executing the capias, a similar delay in hearing from the time of issuance, and at least three of four Barker factors weigh in favor of dismissal.

In Barker, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the “length of delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.  The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has found a two year and ten month delay between arrest and hearing on a speedy trial motion to be “presumptively prejudicial” in a “plain vanilla DWI case.” Zamorano v. State, 84 S.W. 3d 643, 649, 654 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). In addition, the Zamorano Court found that the factor of delay, in and of itself, weighed “heavily against the State,” after considering the almost four-year delay between arrest and ultimate resolution of the case. Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 649.

TrialAmendmentGoing back to the Constitution of the United States, American citizens are guaranteed a speedy and public trial.   The public part is why a Court cannot bar you from entering to watch a trial unless you are a witness, but the speedy part has been developed over the years.  I will concentrate on the State of Texas right to a Speedy Trial this week, which is overwhelmingly similar to the Federal Right but without a few federal specific statutes that can effect federal criminal cases. Additionally, citizens also have a right to a speedy hearing if the State of Texas files a motion to adjudicate or revoke probation, which is the procedure upon an alleged probation violation to impose sentence or modification.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution says that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”  Article I, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution states that “[i]n In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall hav† a speedy public trial by an impartial jury. He shall have the right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and to have a copy thereof.”

bank_robbery_2.jpgSection 7.02(b) states “If, in the attempt to carry out a conspiracy to commit one felony, another felony is committed by one of the conspirators, all conspirators are guilty of the felony actually committed, though having no intent to commit it, if the offense was committed in furtherance of the unlawful purpose and was one that should have been anticipated as a result of the carrying out of the conspiracy.”

The law of party theory most commonly presented at trial is 7.02(a)(2), i.e. that a person intended to promote or assist in the crime being carried out, and solicits (seeks out a person to commit the crime), encourages (does acts to encourage the crime to be committed, including paying money for the crime), directs (orders the crime), aids, or attempts to aid in the crime. The typical case we think of is “murder for hire” in which someone pays another to kill their spouse, or the driver in the “getaway car” from a robbery, but the language is broad and attempts to bring in anyone who intends the crime to be committed and helps or encourages in any way. The jury will be instructed that “mere presence at the scene of an offense is no offense,” but anything more and things could start to get sticky.

The conspiracy statute, 7.02(b), is interesting and has been used in capital murder cases, and in a high profile gang rape recently in local courts. Basically, if two people conspire and agree to commit a felony (such a burglary/robbery/kidnapping/rape, and while trying to carry out that crime, another felony is committed by a member of the conspiracy/agreement, even if the person not intend that crime (carried out by a conspirator in furtherance of the offense) to be committed, if it should have been anticipated, other conspirators are liable under this theory. I.e. if you are committing armed robbery and kidnapping and murder is committed, which could reasonably be foreseeable, a conspirator who only intended to commit robbery could be guilty of the capital murder.

bank_robbery_1.jpgOne of the most common misconceptions in the law is that one actually has to commit a crime themselves to face criminal charges. Better said, it is a misconception that a person must commit all the elements of an offense themselves to be convicted of a crime. However, old distinctions such as “accessory” and “accomplice” have been abolished under Texas law, and a person who commits a crime with the intent that it be committed can be convicted of the offense.

Section 7.01 of the Texas Penal Code states “(a) A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible, or by both. (b) Each party to an offense may be charged with commission of the offense…” Thus, all you have to be is a “party” to a crime by being “criminally responsible” for another’s conduct. Read section two to learn what this actually means.

Section 7.02 of the Penal Code states that “(a) A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if: (1) acting with the kind of culpability required for the offense, he causes or aids an innocent or nonresponsible person to engage in conduct prohibited by the definition of the offense; (2) acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense; or (3) having a legal duty to prevent commission of the offense and acting with intent to promote or assist its commission, he fails to make a reasonable effort to prevent commission of the offense.”

beeronice.jpgNot to be outdone by the wisdom of the Oklahoma Legislature, our braniacs in Austin last year enacted “aggravated” driving while intoxicated provisions similar to the Sooner state, whereby a first time offender now faces a year in jail if the person 1) commits the offense of driving while intoxicated, and 2) “If it is shown on the trial of an offense under this section that an analysis of a specimen of the person’s blood, breath, or urine showed an alcohol concentration level of 0.15 or more at the time the analysis was performed.” The offense is enhanced from a Class B to a Class A misdemeanor.

This is problematic in several respects. First of all, a year punishment range (one day short of the Federal definition of a felony) for a first time, no property damage or injury driving while intoxicated is simply ridiculous. Driving while intoxicated is one of the only offenses above a traffic ticket level that has no mental state. I.e. a person does not have to intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with criminal negligence drive while intoxicated. If you are driving and you are intoxicated (either with a blood alcohol level above .08 or by not being normal due to alcohol or a drug or a combination thereof), you are committing a crime and face the 180 days in jail and $2,000 fine, both of which can be probated for two years. Many good people are arrested for driving while intoxicated for having one drink too many, or because the arresting officer was less competent in his detection skills than he should be.

Now, if you are arrested for driving while intoxicated and cooperate with law enforcement, and the state’s highly unreliable intoxilyzer machine, or a blood test performed by someone who was working at Dairy Queen a few weeks ago, shows a .15 alcohol concentration at the time of the test, not the time of driving, you are punished twice as harshly. Notice, this new law does not require you to be .15 or above at the time of driving, only that your test reveal a .15 or above at the time of testing.

marijuana.jpgHow do you or a loved one end up in the Eastern District of Texas, particularly the Sherman division, sitting in the Fannin County Jail in Bonham, Texas on a drug conspiracy charge? Well, the Sherman Division (with courthouses in Sherman and Plano, Texas) is a choice forum for the United States Department of Justice. They are much more likely to get a conviction in the Sherman Division of the Eastern District of Texas than in Dallas, Texas, located in the Northern District of Texas. The Sherman Division is much more white, conservative and affluent than Dallas. The makeup of jury pools is overwhelmingly white (about 85%, compared to less than 50% in Dallas), and the Sherman Division venue contains Collin and Denton counties, wealthy suburban counties in which all persons are more likely to be more white collar and conservative.

To bring a conspiracy case whose acts occur mostly in Dallas into the Sherman Division of the Eastern District of Texas, some connection to the Eastern District (but not a whole lot) is required. The law of venue requires that an agreement be made in, or an “overt act” take place in or through the Eastern District. Venue is an element of the offense, meaning that at trial the Government must prove venue in the Eastern District of Texas beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, only one overt act in the conspiracy must take place in the Eastern District of Texas for venue to lie here for the entire conspiracy. That is how a person who may have never been north of Dallas or Tarrant County has landed in an Eastern District of Texas conspiracy case and now sits in Bonham, Texas in the Fannin County Jail awaiting trial. It’s called forum shopping, and it isn’t limited to plaintiff’s lawyers. However, when boatloads of Hispanics and African Americans are forum shopped from a minority-rich to an extremely conservative white venue, the ends of justice should require more than a distant, tangential act to bring them before a more foreign venue. Federal statutes and Department of Justice policy provide little relief to such activity, so the case will to a virtual certainly be tried in the Eastern District.

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